THE STONE FLEET IN CHARLESTON HARBOR.
BY LOUIS H. BOLANDER IN BALTIMORE SUN.
The whole world was thrilled when the gallant Lieutenant Hobson and his six brave seamen ran the collier Merrimac into Santiago harbor and sank her in the channel. It was even more thrilled when those marvelous British tars, with unbelievable courage, sank their two ships loaded with cement in the channel at Zeebrugge and effectually blocked that port against the further departure of German U-boats. No one ever raised the question concerning the humanity or inhumanity of either of these two deeds, or whether they violated in any way any prescribed code of civilized warfare.
But during our War between the States a similar deed was attempted, and for months our State Department was besieged with protests against such an uncivilized method of conducting warfare. It came about in this manner. One of the first means sought by the Lincoln Government to bring the South to its knees was to establish a stingent blockade of all Confederate ports from the Virginia capes to the Mexican border. This meant that exactly 185 river openings and _ harbor mouths had to be more or less effectually closed against the ingress or egress of hostile or neutral vessels. Never before in the world's history had a blockade on such magnificent proportions been attempted. And to accomplish this mighty task, just three naval steamers and sixteen ships of sail were available. To the fertile brain of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Gustavus Vasa Fox, it occurred that material aid might be given this small fleet if some of these Southern harbors could be closed permanently and effectually by sinking vessels laden with stone athwart their channels. This would release the Union ships for other service.
He took the matter up with the head of the Coast Survey, Prof. A. D. Bache, in the summer of 1861. Professor Bache thought well of the plan and considered such an undertaking quite feasible. With his indorsement, Fox outlined his scheme to his immediate chief, the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles. Welles was quite enthusiastic over the idea, and ordered one of his officers, Commander Stellwagen, to take charge of the actual work. He was to report to the naval officer at the Port of Baltimore, F. 8. Corkran, who was to purchase a few old ships for the experiment. Welles also ordered the officer in charge of the
fleet blockading the coasts of North Carolina and Virginia to give Stellwagen every possible aid.
This officer, Captain Stringham, was anything but enthusiastic over the idea, and wrote that sinking vessels in a channel where there was a current would do little or no good, as the light and shifting nature of the sand would allow the water soon to cut a new channel as deep and wide as the old one. But Welles was nothing if not obstinate and curtly ordered that "two inlets on the coast of North Carolina be immediately and effectively closed by placing obstructions at the line of meeting of sea and sound," meaning Pamlico Sound off the North Carolina coast. By the middle of September, he had replaced Stringham by Flag Officer Boldsborough, and by the latter part of the same month, Commander Stellwagen had anchored eight vessels loaded with stone off Hatteras Inlet, with orders from Goldsborough to block up three of the inlets into the sound at once.
But Stellwagen was either faint-hearted or averse to this mode of warfare, and wrote Fox that 'there is an evident soreness about the orders for this duty, and I only wish I were free of it, as there is but little inclination to give facilities or to feel cordiality toward the agents employed." He added that it was impossible to block up the inlets anyway. Goldsborough lost his temper with him, and a sharp interchange of letters followed. As a result, Stellwagen was relieved of the duty entirely and another naval officer, Lieutenant Werden, was assigned to the task. He, too, felt that the undertaking was futile and pleaded that three of his eight stone ships were sunk already. He sent his chief written reports of two of his pilots who had navigated the sound for years. Both these men claimed that if they succeeded in blocking the channel the onrushing waters would cut a new channel in thirty days. But Goldsborough placed small reliance on the judgment of the pilots and ordered Werden to go ahead. He told him that he was there to carry out his orders and not to make excuses. Werden was _ a capable and faithful officer and did as he was bid. On the 18th of November he sank the three ships remaining to him in nine feet of water in the channel known as Ocracoke Inlet, where they were chained together, bow and stern. For a time they were a distinct obstacle to navigation, but the pilots were right. A new channel was cut by the current and Werden's work went for nothing.
In the meantime, Fox had been busy with another porject. Charleston and Savannah were
among the most important ports in the South. If these ports could be closed, the rebellion would suffer a serious blow. So in October, 1861, Fox went to New York and made a contract with George D. Morgan, of that city, and Richard H. Chappell, of New London, Conn., to supply the Navy Department with twenty-five old vessels of not less than 250 tons burden each. This order was soon increased by twenty more, forty-five in all. These vessels were to be loaded with stone.
One effect of the war thus far had been to destroy the North Atlantic whaling industry, due in part to fear of Confederate raiders, and in the harbor of New Bedford lay a number of old whaling ships awaiting the return of happier days. Morgan and Chappell heard of these and purchased the lot at prices ranging from $3,150 to $6,500. The entire whaling gear was taken out and sold at bargain prices on the New Bedford wharves. The New Bedford Mercury describes the whole affair:
"As fast as each ship was emptied, she was fitted for convenient scuttling. About two inches above the light-water line a two-inch hole was
bored in the counter, running completely through |
the side of the vessel. Into this from each side was inserted a plug turning to a loose fit, and provided with a flange head sufficiently large to close the opening. These two plugs were held together by a bolt, secured by a head on the outside and by a wrench nut on the inside. At the proper time the nuts were unscrewed, the bolt knocked out, and the two plugs were allowed to fall out, and let the water pour in. One James Duddy, having the contract for supplying stone for the fleet, started into the country, and soon had all the farmers tearing down stone walls, and loading stone on drays."
For this stone, destined to rest forever at the bottom of Charleston harbor, fifty cents a ton was paid.
When the fleet finally assembled at New Bedford, sixteen were found to be of New Bedford origin, eight hailed from New London, and one from New York. Their tonnage aggregated 8,376 tons, with the largest, the bark South America, of 606 tons burden, and the smallest, the Leonidas, of 231 tons. The crews hired to deliver the vessels were to be shipped back to New Bedford free, and there paid off. They were obliged to take the ships to a point not south of Key West. Capt. Rodney French was elected commodore of the fleet. French, who was atferward Mayor of New Bedford, though no better seaman
than the other captains, was a pretty good fellow told a story marvelously well, and was quite popular with his brother captains; only one captain in the whole fleet thought him unfit for the post. As a matter of fact, French's ship, hugging the coast, was the last ship to reach the rendezous off Tybee Island, near Savannah, and as a consequence Rodney became the target for a great deal of good-natured chaffing. Thus his services as fleet commander were not in evidence. x
Probably not a small boy in New Bedford but was at the wharf when the fleet weighed anchor at 7 o'clock on the chill gray morning of November 20, and if he is still alive can tell you all the infinitesimal details sure to rivet the attention of a youngster concerning this historic occasion. Searcely a house in New Bedford but cherishes a reproduction of the painting that was made of the sailing of the great "stone fleet'? which was destined to create an uproar on two continents.
The greater portion of the fleet made the passage down the coast with reasonable speed, and reached Tybee Island in just fifteen days. But two of them went ashore and one of them struck on trying to enter the harbor. Flag Officer Du Pont, who commanded the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, now took charge of the fleet, and the crews were sent back to New Bedford. Du Pont turned the fleet over to a trusted officer, Capt. Charles Henry Davis, with orders to block the main channel leading out of Charleston harbor. Davis was a high-minded man, and though too good an officer to disobey orders, wrote to a friend on December 17: "This is a disagreeable duty and one of the last I should have selected. I always considered this mode of interrupting commerce as liable to great objections and as of doubtful success."
Nevertheless he proceeded with his task. Of the twenty-five ships that left New Bedford, but sixteen were remaining to him. Three had gone ashore, three had been transferred to the army, one had put back to New Bedford, and two were held by DuPont for later use. These sixteen ships were towed in by steamers under the protection of armed ships, their masts and spars having been removed, and sunk upon and inside the bar. They were placed as much as possible at right angels to the direction of the channel, in several lines some distance apart, and were made so nearly to overlie each other that it would have been difficult to draw a line in the direction of the channel which would not have been intercepted by at least one of them. Davis put them down in this man-
ner rather than in a solid line to allow for a reasonable free passage of the waters, and thus prevent the current from cutting a new passage elsewhere. This work was completed on December 20, 1861, just a year to a day after South Carolina had seceded from the Union.
The Confederates watched the sinking of the ships with indignation and dismay, but were powerless to prevent it. Gen. Robert E. Lee, who was then in South Carolina, wrote to the Confederate Secretary of War:
"The enemy brought his stone fleet to the entrance of Charleston harbor to-day and sunk be- tween 13 and 17 vessels in the main ship channel.
This achievement, so unworthy any nation, is the abortive expression of the malice and revenge of a people, which it wishes to perpetuate by render-ing more memorable a day hateful in their calendar."
As General Lee was a notably mild-tempered man, and not given to harsh language, the occasion must have angered him out of his usual calm.
The next month Morgan's second consignment of twenty vessels from New England arrived off Charleston. These ships he had much difficulty in securing, as the supply of old ships suitable for the purpose was running low. He combed every port in New England, going as far north as Maine. To make up the specified number, he was obliged to take a number of ships under the required tonnage. Du Pont now relieved Captain Davis of the duty so repulsive to him, and placed the responsibility of this second squadron on the shoulders of Commander Parrott. The plan to block Savannah harbor had been abandoned, and he was ordered to sink his ships in another channel leading to Charleston, known as Maffitt's Channel. The sinking was completed on January 26, 1862. In. the course of his operations, Parrott noted that the first stone fleet was still in position across the main ship channel, the hulks having sunk just under water, with the waves breaking over them.
But little was gained by the Federal Navy for all this hard work and expense. A Union officer, Commander (later Admiral) Ammen, visited the spot where the ships were sunk after several months had passed, and found that no vestige of the ships remained. It was his theory that the timbers had been eaten away by the terodo navalis, a marine worm which infested the waters in that part of the coast. And the stones, released from their confinement in the hold, had sunk in the mud.
As soon as the action of the Union forces became known in Europe, the Confederate agents stationed there raised a tremendous howl over the inhumanity of the deed. They hoped to use this as a bait to induce England or France or some other European power to ally themselves with the Davis Government and make war upon the United States. For on such an alliance Jefferson Davis was pinning his hopes of final victory.
On the same day that the second stone fleet arrived off Charleston harbor, the English Foreign Office submitted this question to the maritime powers of Europe: "Is the sinking of the stone fleet in the main channel of Charleston harbor contrary to public law, and an outrage on civilization?' Napoleon III, who was spoiling for a war with somebody, and particularly with the United States, answered for France, declaring that it was a piece of "vindictive vandalism" and a "gross violation of the law of nature and nations." No belligerent had any right to destroy such a harbor to the permanent injury of mankind.
The Prussian Foreign Office, with characteristic Teutonic thoroughness, went into a hair-splitting disquisition on the subject. They recognized the right of a nation possessing and holding a port of its own to ruin it forever if necessary for selfdefense, but they denied the right of an aggressor to do so. The United States, they declared, had as much right to destroy Charleston habor to put down rebellion as the Russians had to burn Moscow to defeat Napoleon. Then they wound up their learned discourse by denouncing the sinking of the stone fleet as a crime and an outrage on civilization. Little Sardinia went France one better in condemning the affair. Austria scolded about it in somewhat milder terms. And Russia, Sweden and Holland answered not at all.
Secretary of State Seward, natually was on the defensive. He declared that no American ever conceived that the human hand could place obstructions that the same hand could not remove. And he was probably right. He claimed, too, that there were still two natural channels leading to Charleston harbor in which no obstructions had been placed, and where none would be placed.
John Bigelow, Ambassador to France, wrote to the London Morning Post that it was a weak invention of the Confederates to pretend that: his Government had been destroying Charleston harbor. He claimed that the channel could be cleared and put in better condition than ever in three months and with less expense than would be in- © curred by keeping up the blockade with floating
vessels. He reminded the British through the Post that the great Richelieu had constructed a dike of sunken vessels across the harbor of Rochelle over 4,000 feet long, and by its aid accomplished the destruction of the city; that Russia had defended Sebastopol from an invasion of a British fleet by such a method, and, finally, that on the evacuation of Alexandria in 1807, the British admiral had sunk five vessels laden with stone where it was supposed they would prove an effective and permanent obstacle to navigation.
Nothing came of the whole affair but a few protests to our State Department. The blockade continued as before, but none of the three sunken stone fleets contributed much to its enforcement. The student of international law occasionally finds mention of the Union "'stone fleet,'' and writers on international law still discuss the possible complications growing out of a "'stone blockade."'
Whether the act of the Federal fleet was '"'inhuman" or not the writer does not pretend to say. But, viewed dispassionately after the poison gas and submarine sinkings of the World War, as well as the bombing of cities filled with helpless women and children, the whole affair appears hardly as grave as it must have appeared to the chancelleries of Europe two generations ago.