THREE VITAL EPISODES IN THE ATTACKS ON CHARLESTON.
BY ROBERT W. BARNWELL, SR., FLORENCE, S. C.
All through 1861, Charleston was safe from attack because wooden ships could not pass the forts, soldiers for an overland attempt could not be spared by the North, and guns of sufficient caliber were not to be had; but in 1862, iron ships, quantities of heavy guns, and many trained soldiers came upon the scene of war, and Charleston was faced with many possibilities. She knew that the North was impatient for vengeance upon her because of '' Secession and Sumter."
There were five routes an enemy could take, but after all was said it remained as a conviction that for the sake of their fleet some plan involving the seizure of Stono River would be adopted.
As a matter of fact, both the best route and the
worst called for this seizure.
The seizure became an accomplished fact, and then the enemy made a most feeble effort on the line of the best route and settled fixedly to making a success of the worst. The three episodes this article deals with lead to this result, and are tied together by a logic of circumstances that is very interesting. The episodes are those of Coles Island, Seerssionville, and "South End" (of Norris Island).
Soles Island commanded the mouth of Stono in such wise that both that best and that worst route were dependent on it. The Confederates fortified it and then evacuated it before it ever was threatened, enabling the enemy to gain his harbor for ships, and his point for beginning operations (point d' apperi) without any fighting at all. There were great burnings of heart when Pemberton had the batteries on Coles demolished. -Not even quotation of Lee saved him from feeling out of place and accepting service elsewhere. This evacuation became known too, at once, for the steamer that had moved the guns was, by a most surprising night adventure, carried not long afterwards by its bold negro pilot out of the harbor and over to the enemy. The reader will want to judge of the matter for himself doubtless.
Stono is west of Charleston, with James Island between it and the great harbor. Come up Stono, cross the four or five miles of James Island, and you can have a good fair shot at the city. This western side of Charleston harbor, therefore, now became another battle front, and only miles of redouble, redans and entrenchments could give the Confederates a fighting chance. Not only so, but as you pass the jaws of the Stono entrance,
you find on the north side a marsh over ten miles | long, and averaging three miles wide (See Gov- |): ernment Costal Survey Chart), cut up by innum- | erable streams—a great connecting system, lead- |
ing direct towards the inner harbor and that Norris Island beach on which the enemy longed to plant his guns. For this thirty square miles of marsh lies between the south shore of James Island and the two barrier—beach islands, Fall and Norris, which, if held by the enemy, meant for him health for his troops and security for his batteries. Flanked by ocean and this marsh, and kept salubrious by the constant seabreezes, the enemy at once so coveted them that he soon lost his military judgment and ceased to struggle for that best of routes, the road across James Island. However, for the Confederates it meant another great stretch or redoubts and redans defending this south front. Add all the forts of the harbor and the lines of batteries on the four miles of Sullivan's Island, and also add the great batteries Wagner and Gregg on Norris, and one gets an idea of what guns, etc., it took to defend Charleston.
However, Coles Island itself would -have required.some guns. It was in those days two miles long, averaging one hundred and fifty yards wide, and curved so as to be partly facing Stono and partly Folly River (of the marsh), and thoroughly commanding the entrance to both. It could be enfiladed from positions either on Folly Island across FoHy River, or on Kiawah Island across Stono, so, at least, one fort on Folly would have been necessary. Again, Coles Island was connected with James by two long causeways across Folly River, or on Kiawah Island across marsh, hammocks, and creeks. It would have required Confederate valor and endurance to hold it. Beauregard, Ripley, and Hagood certainly believed in holding it, and I believe the great majority of the military men concerned also deplored its abandonment. In as much as the enemy, while promptly seizing it, were inveigled into a wrong choice of routes, the loss was not so regretable in the end; but if they had taken the great opportunity offered for a valid approach to Charleston, instead of the cul de sac on Norris Island, there would have been a bloodier story to tell.
Coles Island was fortified by Hagood, under Ripley, in August, 1861, and demolished in April, 1862. In May, 1862, while DuPont and Hunter were planning some sort of opening campaigns, Robert Smalls, the negro pilot, brought them the Planter and the news. By June 2, the Federals placed their troops, unresisted, on James Island,
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and on Folly as well. The battle of Secessionville
followed on June 16. This settled Hunter, for he
withdrew from James, though holding Folly. The two rives, Stono and Folly, of course, were patrolled by the navy. Now came an unexpected thing—not until April, 18638, was Charleston again molested, and only by the fleet even then. Those few short hours of fight with Sumter and Moulrie, etc., sufficed DuPont, even as little Secessionville satisfied Hunter. But in July of that year, the Federal army on Folly came to life, and under Gillmore, powder was burned ad nauseam. Stanton called him to Washington for a consultation, and- having heard him, gave him free rein, promising support. He was put in complete command, and engaged to destroy Sumter so that the navy could then enter the harbor and take the city.;
It was natural, I suppose, for Gillmore to prefer a plan of his own to one that had been suggested by Benham to Hunter, and had produced the awful failure of Secessionville; but it was a blessing to the Confederates that the abilities of Gillmore were not devoted to the "western gate" attack. "South End" and Wagner were convining samples of determination and skill. Gillmore's name would stand exceedingly high. were it not that the faultiness of judgment displayed in his basic decision, when he pitched his campaign, somewhat pulls him down. However, let us see something of Secessionville and have a_ background for "South End."
Benham was that general with whom Rosecrans had so much trouble in the first West Virginia campaign, but Benham had achievements behind him. First in his class at West Point, and lauded by Scott as worthy of two brevats for services on two successive days in the Mexican War, having been very active in the fights on the Ganley, and recently a leader in the taking of Fort Pulaski, he was listened to by DuPont and Hunter when he broached a plan of campaign that promised great business for both arms of the service. This plan we can see in the "Official Records." He proposed, as a mere kind of incident
-of the spring campaign, landing and marching
across James Island and then calling for big guns to batter both city and Sumter. He came with Hunter June 2, 1862, and pitched his camp on the island. Then Hunter went back, and, leaving him in charge, wrote out his orders (see official records) positively forbidding him "to advance on Charleston or attack Fort Johnson''—one of the harbor big forts and on the island shore—unless
heavily reénforced, or given orders. But he was to "'provide for a secure entrenched encampment," and this where the gun boats in Stono and the big branch of Folly could cross their fire in his front and keep it clear. There was but one place for this stipulation to apply—the spot where Hunter left him with two brigades.
Now it so happened that the recently erected and unfinished fort of the Confederates, across the neck of land on which Secessionville stood, could reach with its four guns nearly all parts of that camp, and only by constant reply could he get any peace. Therefore, under the plan of seeking peace and security for his camp, and persuading himself that the term '"'reconnoisance in force" would save him in case of trouble with Hunter he took his more than six thousand men to storm, at daylight, that troublesome battery. Hunter at Hilton Head, was furious, cut off his official head, and sent him North to encounter Stanton, etc. Benham had a time of it, but finally was restored to service after long punishment. He, too, was mad with Stevens, who led the storming troops.
The fort at Secessionville was almost a mile in front, and left of the line of Confederate works that ran parallel to-Stono for five miles, and ended at the northern boundary with a strong fort out in front, just as at Secessionville. This was Fort Pemberton, for he had planned and beyun this whole defense of the island. The lines were two miles back from the river, and left all that space for the enemy. The plea for yielding such space was—gunboats and their big shells! Beauregard afterwards changed these lines a good deal.
But the fort at Secessionville was well placed, and a fitting flank-guard for the south end of the line. Here is a brief idea of it and its setting: Conceive a battle shaped spit of land, about five feet out of water at high tide, extending eastward into a mass of marsh grass for half a mile, and being less than a quarter at widest part, with only one hundred and fifty yards at the neck, across which stretched a ditch and earthworks, with embrasures for a few guns, four being in place. These earthworks bend back toward the east for a space as they reach the edges of the land. There is a creek as well as marsh to the north, and a water covered mud-flat to the south. The enemy must attack from the west. His camps are there —a mile and a half away. He will come straight down a road that leads from the "big road" to the Secessionville settlement through two windbrake hedges and two cotton fields, with heavy beds
made the year before. From the tip end of bottle there is a footbridge that runs north over marsh and water for nearly a mile to another neck and over it will come reénforcements for the fort. On that other neck is a battery that can play on enemy in front of the fort when they attack. The marsh and creek to the north are narrow where the fort across the neck is, and the enemy will put men over there to flank the works, and the reénforcements for the fort, coming by the footbridge, will fight those men, firing from the edges of the bottle just back of the neck. There is a fringe of bushes all around the edges of bottle neck, and land beyond. The enemy's line will be too long to fit the narrow neck, and some troops will be pushed into the marsh, and crouch behind those bushy edges. The big low-country cotton beds, too, will jar the troops that try to double quick over them no little. They will want to shout, as the stout old man did as he chased the little boy—''Take down the row, you villain." Then, too, attacking troops had to consider how those two windbrake hedges would affect and break their formation ere they reached the entrenchments. Although the coast survey charts of 1858 and Captain Bontelle, who helped make them, were a part of the Federal equipment, and the shape and size of the bottle neck were easily known to their generals, they had had no way of guaging the terrain over which they were to charge in these smaller matters.
The Confederate lines across the island lay nearly a mile behind the fort attached. General N. G. Evans ("Old Shanks') had troops behind them, and this fort was expected to hold out at least long enough to enable reénforcements to come, if needed. The fort had its own pickets, and Evans was using nearly four regiments under Colonel Hagood to picket the long stretch of main lines—half on duty and half in reserve each night and day. These picket troops and the garrison, with the help of one hundred soldiers sent before day to work on the unfinished fort, amounted to thirteen hundred men, of which less than five hundred were inside, two hundred and fifty outside (the reénforcements), and the rest with Hagood, extended in line of battle between the fort and the main lines. The Federals would bring 6,600 men to the fight, of which 5,000 would be engaged.
General Benham's plan was good. His trouble was that, having to defend himself to Hunter under the plea of a "'reconnoissance in force," if first repulsed decisively, he could hardly try it a second
time. Even as it was, he lost 683 men to his opponents 204. He came at daylight, almost reached the fort at the same time with its pickets, and assaulted with 3,500 men, while 1,500 or 1,600 fought as flankers from the other side of the creek and marsh, 250 yards away, and 1,500 more guarded his rear and the road back to camp. The flanking force had Hagood flanking them, and in any second assault Evans would have thrown in more troops both to Hagood and the fort. The defender of the fort, Colonel Lamar, was wounded, and the fort was then named for him. Even after Benham got back to camp, Fort Lamar could drop shells on most of it.
General J. J. Stevens put his two Federal brigades into the assault strictly according to rule, but they reached the works in waves, giving the appearance of three attacks and, all being most gallantly repulsed, he drew the troops all back to the first windbrake, waiting for Benham to give further orders; for, as a reconnoissance, the conditions were satisfied. His soldiers had shown both spirit and courage, and he had lost over five hundred men, which was just about the number Lamar commanded in the fort.
This battle was the only attempt, save one more feeble threat, at the time "South End" was fought, that the Federals made. Hunter withdrew his entire force from James Island almost at once, and later gave place to Gillmore as chief in command before Charleston. The Federal loss at Secessionville was little less than that the Confederates were to lose in all the fighting Gillmore was to occasion at "South End," two assaults on Wagner, fifty-eight days of the seige of Wagner, in Battery Gregg, and in Fort Sumter itself— 683 and 693. Gillmore was not to come on the scene until June, 1863. (See Beauregard's Report, p. 93, Vol. 28, Official Records.)
General Q. A. Gillmore' having expressed to friends his conviction that Sumter could be injured beyond all power of harm, and thus a way opened for the navy to the inner harbor, he was called to Washington, May, 1863, for consultation. In Vol. 28, Official Record, one can read all about his views. He says that the navy said that if Sumter, with its plunging fire on the decks of their monitors, was out of the way, they could enter the harbor, that to attack by land would require large forces to hold the barrier-beach islands, and also attempt to capture all of James Island, but with present forces—11,000—he believed he could move from Folly to Norris and batter down Sumter, leaving the navy to go in and
take the city. He believed the Confederates had large forces, and Benham's attack had revealed strong fortifications.
Now, all this is very true except as to the Confederate forces. Gettysburg and Vicksburg, during June, 1863, drew all possible troops from Charleston, leaving in the whole "1st District" less than 2,500 infantry to help the artillery in all the forts. These battles were on July 3, and Gillmore attacked on July 10. But one thing is now and was then, evident. In case the navy was
mistaken, then all the vast effort would go for
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| available. | marsh island batteries been completed.
nothing. Although an engineer, he took a gambler's risk and lost: The navy was often mistaken.
Gillmore was opposed to a master of fortification and defense. Beauregard had been there
since September, 1862, and Sumter was no longer
necessary to Charleston. Gillmore was to end facing the crash of his hopes with not a word to
say except that he had done what he set out to do.
How much Beauregard inwardly rejoiced to see Gillmore do the thing he least feared we cannot say. Beauregard had defenses at the gateway —"South End''—but they were not as yet up to the Beauregard standard. Things there were somewhat of an invitation to the enemy. But the lock to the gate had been ordered, and, even as things stood, more men would have kept the gate closed. We have seen how Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and let us add, Bragg at Tullahoma, drew all forces away from Charleston and Savannah. It need only be said that the labor for constructing Beauregard's lock failed utterly in supply. The War Department had been well informed of conditions—both as to danger and remedies. The lock was to be two batteries and a bridge for a hammock in the marsh commanding the reach of the creek between Folly and Norris Island. Had these been in place, Gillmore's plan for taking "South End" would not have been formed, for his small boats and barges could not have ventured on crossing.
The defense was eleven separated guns behind entrenchments on sand hills and some rifle pits down by the water landing. The gun crews were sufficient, but for the landing only one regiment of four hundred and one company of forty were This would have sufficed had the As it was that feéble force was wholly inadequate. Gillmore had sent some gun boats up a river
_ (Edisto) leading into the interior of the 1st Dis-
trict, so as to hold off reénforcements from there, and also both gun boats and a strong force up Stono to land and threaten the western route.
Then he threw down on Folly Island the screens of forty-seven guns (their presence, but not numbers, was known by the Confederates) and from up Light House Inlet (the dividing creek) came in early morning a whole brigate, while another stood ready to embark as soon as the boats landed the first and came for them. Then, taking advantage of low tide and high banks, a regiment went down almost to the ocean and landed on the other flank where there was no infantry to resist. These last began taking the batteries in flank and rear so that the men in the rifle pits would soon be flanked also. The forty-seven guns and two brigades against four hundred and forty men proved quite sufficient with a loss of three hundred, the Confederates were whipped and retired. Even this was not all, for the Federal fleet had come close to shore, and their 15-inch shells took part in both the battle and the retreat. The poor beaten, but gallant fellows had some two miles to go in order to reach Wagner, and their road was seldom more than an open beach. They had their hour of triumph next day, the 11th of July, and also on the 18, when, in the attack on Wagner, the ground was heaped with dead and wounded invaders of their country.*
General Hagood, in his most interesting discussion of the whole story of Charleston's defense, in his book "Memoirs of the War of Secession." shows that if Gillmore had all that day threatened a crossing, and also pushed his threat on the western front, and that night gone up Light House Inlet in his boats to "Legaré Landing,'" where Battery Haskell afterwards stood, he could have doubtless gone without resistance as far as Fort Johnson on the Harbor shore before day light, and there being little defense for it at the back, accomplished a wonderful coup de maire. Hagood, however, does not discuss the tides and mudflats enough, and forgets that the Federal coastal armies felt lost when their navy was not there with its "flour barrels."' That marsh at that. point is three miles broad and five miles away from Stono River. The most timid thing on earth in those four years was a Federal army away from its protecting gunboats. Pocotaligo, Gullifiny, Coosawhatchie, and Honey Hill can testify on that point.
*Note—The Official Records give only about two hundred dead before Battery Wagner on the 18th, but that was the number buried by themselves. The Confederates would not let their burial parties come nearer than the picket' line and buried those close to the Battery to the number of more than six hundred. The Federal loss in that attack was, 2,100 instead of the 1,500 given in Official Record.