Confederate Veteran

Signal Corps in Defense of Charleston

Volume 28, July 1920, page 259

The Confederate Signal Corps on Sullivan's Island reads the Federal fleet's own code, learns in advance that the bombardment of 18 July 1863 will end at sunset as the signal for the assault on Battery Wagner, and gets the warning into the fort.

Signed “By R. de T. Lawrence, Marietta, Ga.”

Cite as

R. de T. Lawrence, “Signal Corps in Defense of Charleston,” Confederate Veteran 28, no. 7 (July 1920)*: 259.

Published
July 1920issue inferred
Volume
28, no. 7
Pages
259
Author
R. de T. Lawrence

SIGNAL CORPS IN DEFENSE OF CHARLESTON. BY R. DE T. LAWRENCE, MARIETTA, GA.

While the receiving and transmitting of reports of movements of the enemy were duties assigned to the Signal Corps on the islands and forts around Charleston, it happened that it performed a much more important part in the defense of the city. We had learned the alphabet, or code, of the enemy, reported at the time to be due to the capture of a signal station in the lower part of South Carolina. Equipped with this important information, three signalmen were secretly located on the east end of Sullivan's Island, where they were in direct line with signals sent from the blockading fleet to the force on land, for the Federals had possession of the south end of Morris Island, as we did a portion of the north end; and as the admiral was the commanding officer, his orders were most important, as they directed the movements of both sea and land forces.

On July 10, 1863, soon after General Gillmore had secured possession of a portion of Morris Island, an attack was made on Battery Wagner, which was easily repulsed. On July 18 intercepted dispatches sent from the fleet showed that after a terrific bombardment by the fleet during the day at sunset the firing would cease, which would be the signal for a desperate assault on Battery Wagner. With this valuable information, our men protected themselves in the bomb-proofs while the bombardment was going on and as soon as it ceased prepared themselves for the attack, which was made as anticipated and during which Colonel Shaw's 54th Massachusetts Negro Regiment, which was placed in front, was practically annihilated, and the Federals were compelled to withdraw in a panic with a loss said at the time of 1,800 of the enemy killed and wounded to 110 on our side, or, as reported by a Northern writer, of 2,000 killed, wounded, and missing, with a loss to us of 175 killed and wounded. During the terrific bombardment of Battery Wagner Lieut. Iredell Jones took the intercepted dispatches to the battery without injury. Some years after, in conversation with a friend from the North in regard to the monument at Boston to Colonel

Shaw's regiment, he said it was a shame that those negroes were put in front in the attack.

Each squad of three men of the Signal Corps was apportioned to one week's service on Morris Island. So on September 1, 1863, it came the turn of W. A. Clark, Edward Legare, and R. deT. Lawrence to spend a week at the front, and, as it happened, the last week on Morris Island before its evacuation by us. An intercepted dispatch gave us information in advance of a plan to attack Battery Gregg. Having failed to take Battery Wagner by assault, it was planned to capture it from the rear, for Battery Gregg was located on the north end of the island a short distance from Wagner. Two small cannon and a detachment were sent from Charleston after dark and placed in position where, as anticipated, the enemy attempted to land. The boats with their loads arrived just before daybreak, as predicted by Mr. Legare; but we were so well advised in advance of their coming that, without allowing them to land, after a few shots from our two small pieces the enemy left without firing a gun. While awaiting the attack (for, of course, no one slept till it was made and repulsed) the writer stepped to the beach, a few yards off, where he met the sentinel, who declared that he preferred to be back in Virginia, as he could stand the Minié balls better than the cannon balls and shells; but he was assured that he was as safe on the beach for that night as if we were by the fireside at his home. An intercepted dispatch had informed us that the guns from the fleet would be trained on Sullivan's Island and Fort Sumter, but not a shot would be directed toward Morris Island during the night.

Some two weeks after an article from a correspondent of the New York Herald told that the attack had been planned for the night before it was made; but the attacking party having fired at a boat taking a wounded officer to the city, ir was feared this might have notified us of the proposed attack, which was postponed till the following night. The captured crew, to their credit, all Irishmen, preferred imprisonment to taking the oath of allegiance.

Again an intercepted message notified us in advance of an attack on Fort Sumter with marines from the fleet. Coming quietly, intending a surprise, the enemy found the men, who had burrowed under the débris of the fort, awaiting them and standing in the dust and broken bricks, with Minieé balls and brickbats drove off the boats with their crews. A friend to whom I told the condition of the fort at this time was in doubt until some years after the war a picture in the London Strand of the east, or sea, side of the fort showed that the best protection we had was made by the enemy in the amount of iron lodged on the brick dust.

While under incessant shelling the three signalmen, the last to leave the island, suffered no injury except a slight wound from a fragment of shell, which did more harm to the gray jacket of the writer than it did to his person, and a severe burn suffered by Mr. Clark from the turpentine used in the signal torch.

I will add that after the battle of Secessionville, on James Island, in which the enemy's loss to ours was fifteen to one and in which the writer escaped with three dead, including the second lieutenant, lying immediately around him, no further attempt was made to capture Charleston from the land side. So after their experience on Morris Island and at Fort Sumter attacks from the sea side ended, and Charleston was entered by the enemy only when Sherman's march through South Carolina necessitated our giving up the city.

Editorial notes

Statements in this article that are wrong, doubtful, or worth setting beside another account. The article’s own text is left as printed.

  1. “We had learned the alphabet, or code, of the enemy”

    True, and it is the most valuable thing in the article. The Confederate Signal Corps at Charleston was reading Federal flag and torch signals from 1863, and the intelligence reached the garrison of Battery Wagner before the assault of 18 July. Lawrence's account is one of the few first-hand statements of it.

  2. “Colonel Shaw's 54th Massachusetts Negro Regiment … was practically annihilated”

    Overstated. The 54th lost about 270 of some 600 engaged — a fearful proportion, but the regiment was reconstituted and served on to the end of the war.

  3. “a loss said at the time of 1,800 of the enemy killed and wounded to 110 on our side, or, as reported by a Northern writer, of 2,000 … with a loss to us of 175”

    The second pair is nearly right: Union losses on 18 July were 1,515 and Confederate 174. The figures Lawrence heard at the time were inflated, as they usually were.

  4. “On July 10, 1863 … an attack was made on Battery Wagner, which was easily repulsed”

    The Federals landed on Morris Island on 10 July and assaulted Wagner at dawn on the 11th, losing 339 men. Lawrence compresses the two days.

  5. “Lieut. Iredell Jones took the intercepted dispatches to the battery without injury”

    Iredell Jones of the 1st South Carolina Artillery, whose own letters from Morris Island survive and corroborate the picture.